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57 ABSTRACT 
A personal digital assistant (PDA) receives and executes 
both encrypted and unencrypted programs. Encrypted pro 
grams are fairly secure from virus infection, while unen 
crypted programs are not. To prevent contamination of the 
PDA with infected encrypted programs, only those 
encrypted programs that are keyed to the individual PDA's 
unique device identifier can be decrypted and executed by 
that PDA. To prevent non-secure programs from corrupting 
secure programs and their data, programs that were received 
unencrypted are prevented from modifying programs that 
were received encrypted as well as data generated by their 
execution. When a user suspects a virus infection, the user 
pushes a special button on the PDA that prevents execution 
of programs that were received unencrypted and hence are 
suspected of being infected, while allowing continued 
execution of programs that were received encrypted and 
hence are presumed to be secure. 
9 Claims, 3 Drawing Sheets 
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SOLATION OF NON-SECURE SOFTWARE 
FROM SECURE SOFTWARE TO LIMIT 
WRUS NFECTION 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
This invention relates to stored-program controlled 
machines and to software virus counter-measures in such 
machines. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
Stored-program controlled machines, especially personal 
computers (PCs) and personal digital assistants (PDAs), are 
becoming widely owned and operated in an environment 
where software is increasingly freely shared between users. 
In this environment, software viruses are likely to spread as 
rapidly as any disease would in a corresponding environ 
ment of living organisms. Effective ways to reduce the 
damage of virus infections are therefore becoming ever 
more important. 
Presently, most software intended for wide distribution is 
sold "shrink-wrapped". That is, each copy of the software is 
identical to all other copies, and the copies run on machines 
that are fungible for purposes of executing individual copies 
of the software. When a machine gets infected with a 
software virus, special virus-detection software may be used 
to identify and eliminate the virus and its effects. A balance 
of sorts exists: viruses are easy to write because each target 
program is identical, but infections can be easily detected 
because, once a particular virus is found, its "signature” can 
be tracked to other machines. However, this balance is easily 
upset when a virus is quickly disseminated, such as often 
happens in an environment of widespread software sharing 
between users. Before the virus' signature can be distributed 
to the virus-detection software, many or even most machines 
in the environment may become infected. This may be a 
particular problem with PDAs. For example, PDAs might be 
used by students who share information throughout the day. 
Wireless infra-red communications make such sharing 
simple and fast. A new virus might easily sweep through a 
schoolin days, long before the virus-detection software can 
be adapted to recognize the new threat. 
Preventing users from sharing software with each other is 
one effective way of preventing the spread of software 
viruses. For example, each machine may be provided with a 
built-in unique identifier, and a software supplier may pro 
vide software only in encrypted form that requires a par 
ticular key, such as a particular machine's unique identifier, 
for decryption. In this manner, the supplier can restrict the 
use of each copy of the software to only one particular target 
machine. Since only the target machine can decrypt an 
individual copy of the encrypted software, the software 
cannot be shared, and hence a virus that infects a copy of the 
software cannot readily spread to other machines. Clearly, 
this greatly slows the rate of infection. 
Until now, most software suppliers have avoided distrib 
uting copies of software that are keyed to individual 
machines, primarily because it would be a nightmare for 
retail stores to stock appropriate wares. With today's high 
speed data networks and PDAs with convenient wireless 
connections, individually-keyed encrypted software could 
be easily distributed and downloaded into target machines, 
and quickly be decrypted by today's fast microprocessors. 
However, in order for the protection provided by the keying 
mechanism to remain effective, this would require all of the 
software to be distributed through either a single or a limited 
number of secure and trustworthy distribution channels who 
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would be entrusted with knowledge of individual machines' 
identifiers and who would be relied upon to key copies of 
software for the individual target machines. One likely such 
distribution channel would be the manufacturer of the target 
machines. But software suppliers are likely to object to 
participating in a distribution channel for their products that 
they would not control. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
This invention is directed to solving these and other 
problems and disadvantages of the prior art. Generally 
according to the invention, both encrypted and unencrypted 
(clear) software is allowed to enter, and execute on, an 
individual machine. While the acceptance of clear software 
exposes the machine to being invaded by a virus, the damage 
that such a virus may inflict is limited by means of an 
arrangement such as an actuator that, when it has been 
actuated, isolates the clear software from the machine, for 
example by preventing the machine from accepting, or 
executing accepted, clear software, without affecting soft 
ware that was received in encrypted form. Preferably, clear 
software is only allowed to read, but is not allowed to write 
over, data created or protected by the encrypted software. 
Also preferably, the clear software is not allowed to write 
over the encrypted software's portion of memory. 
Specifically according to the invention, a program 
execution apparatus comprises a receiver for receiving both 
encrypted programs and unencrypted programs, storage for 
storing the received programs, a program executor for 
executing the stored programs, and an arrangement that 
selectively prevents the program executor from executing 
the stored programs that were received unencrypted while it 
allows the program executor to execute the stored programs 
that were received encrypted. Illustratively, the arrangement 
comprises a manually-actuatable actuator that, when 
actuated, prevents the program executor from executing the 
stored programs that were received unencrypted. 
Encrypted programs are deemed to be fairly secure from 
virus infection, while unencrypted programs are not. Thus, 
when a virus infection of the program-execution apparatus is 
suspected, the abovementioned arrangement is engaged to 
prevent execution of the programs that were received unen 
crypted and hence are suspected of being infected by virus. 
Even while execution of the programs that were received 
unencrypted is prevented, execution is allowed of programs 
that were received encrypted and hence are presumed to not 
be infected. In this manner, the non-secure programs and 
their likely virus infection are isolated from the apparatus 
without interfering with functioning of the apparatus that is 
not likely to have been affected by the infection. 
Preferably, to prevent unauthorized sharing of encrypted 
programs and thereby to prevent any possibility of contami 
nation of an individual program-execution apparatus with a 
virus-infected encrypted program from another program 
execution apparatus, each individual program-execution 
apparatus has its own unique apparatus identifier. The pro 
gram executor executes only unencrypted programs, and 
each program-execution apparatus further includes a 
decryptor that decrypts into unencrypted programs only 
those of the received encrypted programs that are encrypted 
via an encryption scheme that is based on the apparatus 
identifier of that particular apparatus. 
Further preferably, to prevent the non-secure programs 
those received in unencrypted form-from corrupting 
secure programs-those received in encrypted form-and 
their data, programs that were received unencrypted are 
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prevented from modifying programs that were received 
encrypted as well as data generated by their execution. 
These and other advantages and features of the invention 
will become more apparent from the following description 
of an illustrative embodiment of the invention taken together 
with the drawing. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWING 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an illustrative telecommu 
nication system and of a personal digital assistant thereof, 
which includes an illustrative embodiment of the invention; 
FIG. 2 is a flow diagram of an illustrative procedure for 
obtaining encrypted software at a PDA of the system of FIG. 
1; 
FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of an illustrative procedure for 
obtaining clear software at a PDA of the system of FIG. 1; 
and 
FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of a procedure for preventing 
clear software from changing data or instructions of 
encrypted software in the system of FIG. 1. 
DETALED DESCRIPTION 
FIG. 1 shows an illustrative telecommunications system 
that comprises a plurality of PDAs 107-108. The PDAs 
107-108 are interconnected with each other and with other 
communications entities, such as a server 105 and a bulletin 
board 106, by a network 114. Connection of PDAs 107-108 
to network 114 is either wired, such as via telephone lines, 
or wireless, such as via infrared (IR) links. As described so 
far, the telecommunications system of FIG. 1 and its ele 
ments are conventional. 
PDAs 107 and 108 are also substantially conventional in 
structure. For illustration, the structure of a representative 
PDA 108 is shown in FIG. 1. PDA 108 comprises a central 
processing unit (CPU) 109 for executing programs, a 
decryption engine 103 for decrypting encrypted information, 
a local memory 104 for storing data and programs that are 
presently needed by CPU 109 and decryption engine 103, a 
peripheral controller that interfaces CPU 109 to a keyboard 
101 and a display 100, a main memory 102 for storing all 
data and programs required by PDA 108, and a main 
memory controller 111 for interfacing CPU 109 to main 
memory 102. Elements 103, 104, 109, 110, and 111 are 
interconnected for communication by a bus 113. Also con 
nected to bus 113 is a transceiver modem 112 that commu 
nicatively couples PDA 108 to network 114. 
According to the invention, programs distributed in both 
encrypted and clear (unencrypted) form are allowed to 
reside and selectively execute on PDA 108. An illustrative 
procedure for obtaining and installing encrypted software is 
flow-charted in FIG. 2, while an illustrative procedure for 
obtaining and installing clear software is flowcharted in FIG. 
3 
If the user of PDA 108 wishes to purchase for PDA 108 
a new software product that is distributed in encrypted form, 
the user invokes execution of a software-purchase program 
500 on PDA 108, at step 200. Execution of program 500 
causes modem 112 to access (call) the vendor's server 105 
through network 114, at step 202. Once connected to server 
105, at step 203, program 500 passes the identifier (e.g., 
name, or catalog number) of the desired software product to 
server 105, at step 204, and also passes a unique device 
identifier (ID) of PDA 108 to server 105, at step 206. In 
response to receipt of the software identifier and device ID, 
at step 205, server 105 checks a database to ensure that the 
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identified PDA 108 is authorized to receive the identified 
software, at step 208. For example, server 105 checks 
whether PDA 108 has pre-paid for the software, or has a 
valid account with server 105 which can be debited by the 
amount of the purchase price. 
Assuming that PDA 108 is found at step 208 to be 
authorized to receive the identified software, server 105 
encrypts the identified software product with an encryption 
key that is based on the received D, at step 210, and passes 
the encrypted software to PDA 108 via network 114, at step 
212. Server 105 then makes a record of this transaction, at 
step 215. In response to receipt of the software by PDA 108, 
at step 213, program 500 causes the received encrypted 
software to be stored in local memory 194, at step 214, and 
activates decryption engine 103. 
In a conventional manner, such as recognition of a valid 
header or checksum and/or instruction set, decryption 
engine 103 determines whether the received software is 
acceptably encrypted, at step 218. This step will detect, and 
reject, unencrypted software as well as encrypted software 
which has been modified subsequently to being encrypted. It 
will also reject encrypted software that has been encrypted 
with an encryption key that is based on the device D of a 
machine other than the receiving machine. If the software is 
not acceptably encrypted, it is rejected, at step 219. If the 
software is found to be acceptably encrypted, decryption 
engine 103 then uses a decryption key that is based on the 
ID of PDA108 to decrypt the received software, at step 220. 
The fact that both the encryption and decryption keys are 
based on the ID of PDA 108 ensures that only PDA 108 and 
no other PDA can decrypt the encrypted software. Decryp 
tion engine 103 then stores the decrypted software in main 
memory 102, at step 222, and causes this software to be 
identified as secure software, at step 224. For example, 
decryption engine 103 identifies this software as secure 
software to main memory controller 111, and main memory 
controller 111 stores this information for future use. Or, 
decryption engine sets a special security bit 151, that is 
included with every word 150 in main memory 102, for all 
memory words 150 that store the decrypted software. Any 
data created by execution of this secure software and stored 
in main memory 102 will also be identified as secure, in like 
2. 
Alternatively, as shownin dashed lines in FIG.2, upon its 
receipt by PDA 108 at step 213, the received software is 
stored in encrypted form in main memory 102, at step 226, 
is checked for being acceptably encrypted, at step 228, and 
if it is found to be acceptably encrypted, is identified as 
secure software, e.g., by means of setting security bit 151 of 
main memory words 150 that store the encrypted software, 
at step 230. If found to not be acceptably encrypted, the 
software is rejected, at step 229. Decryption engine 103 then 
decrypts the stored encrypted software each time that execu 
tion of that software is invoked. This is particularly useful 
when main memory 102 is an external memory (e.g., a 
PCMCIAflash memory card), removable from PDA 108 and 
connectable to another PDA. Had the software been stored 
in decrypted form on the removable memory, a virus could 
be introduced by changing both the code and the security bit 
151. Storage in encrypted form prevents tampering. (Note 
that the use of a security code in this case is merely a matter 
of convenience, since decryption engine 103 still checks if 
the software is encrypted.) 
if the user of PDA 108 wishes to obtain for PDA 108 a 
new software product that is distributed in clear form, the 
user invokes execution of the software purchase program 
500 on PDA 108, at step 300. Execution of program 500 
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causes modem 112 to access a vendor's server 105 or a 
bulletin board 106 from which the software is obtainable, at 
step 302. Once connected to the source of the software, at 
step 303, program 500 passes the identifier of the desired 
software product to the source, at step 304. In response to 
receipt of the software identifier, at step 305, the source 
optionally engages PDA 108 in communications to deter 
mine whether PDA 108 is authorized to receive the identi 
fied software, at step 308. For example, the source may 
request PDA 108 to provide the device ID of PDA 108, and 
may then use this ID to undertake the same determination as 
was described for step 208 of FIG. 2. Assuming that the 
check of step 308 either is not performed, or is performed 
and successfully passes, the software source passes the 
desired software to PDA 108 via network 114, at step 312. 
In response to receipt of this software by PDA 108, at step 
313, program 500 causes the received software to be stored 
in local memory 104, at step 314, and activates decryption 
engine 103. 
In the conventional manner described for step 218 of FIG. 
2, decryption engine 103 determines whether the received 
software is not encrypted, at step 318. If the software is 
found to be encrypted, steps 218 et seq. of FIG. 2 are 
invoked. If the software is found to not be encrypted, 
decryption engine 103 stores the received unencrypted soft 
ware in main memory 102, at step 222. The software is not 
identified as secure, e.g., bits 151 of words 150 that store the 
software are not set. Any data created by execution of this 
software will likewise not be identified as secure. 
Alternatively, PDA 108 can also receive clear software 
from another PDA via a conventional file transfer. 
During execution of programs by PDA 108, only pro 
grams that are identified as secure are allowed to change any 
words 150 (either data words or instruction words) that are 
identified as secure. Clear programs are allowed to change 
words 150 that are not identified as secure, but clear pro 
grams may only read words 150 that are identified as secure. 
This is illustrated in FIG. 4. 
Whenever an executing program causes CPU 109 to 
request access to a word 150 of main memory 102, execu 
tion of a secure program 600 is invoked, at step 400. 
Program 600 checks whether the word 150 that is sought to 
be accessed is identified (see, e.g., discussion of step 224 of 
FIG. 2) as secure, at step 402. If not, the access is allowed, 
at step 408; if so, program 600 checks whether the request 
ing programis identified as a secure program, at step 404. If 
so, the access is allowed, at step 408; if not, program 600 
checks whether the access is a read or a write access, at step 
406. If it is a read access, it is allowed, at step 408; if it is 
a write access, it is denied, at step 410. 
fat any time PDA 108 appears to be infected with a virus (e.g., it exhibits erratic behavior, performs unusually slowly, 
etc.), the user of PDA108 presses a button 152 on PDA 108. 
Button 152 is interfaced to CPU 109, and pressing of button 
152 prevents CPU 109 from executing clear software. 
Illustratively, pressing of button 152 sends a command to 
CPU 109 that directs CPU 109 to stop executing any 
software that is notidentified as secure. Effectively, pressing 
of button 152 isolates the clear software, which is the most 
likely software to beinfected by virus, and hence isolates the 
virus itself. Execution of secure software is allowed to 
proceed unimpeded. 
Alternatively, infection with a virus may also be detected 
automatically by PDA 108, for example, by execution of 
maintenance and diagnostic software, which may then auto 
matically undertake the requisite action to isolate the clear 
software. 
O 
15 
35 
45 
50 
55 
60 
6 
Of course, various changes and modifications to the 
illustrative embodiment described above will be apparent to 
those skilled in the art. For example, instead of each word 
150 of main memory 102 being marked with a security bit, 
the marking may be done on a per-blockbasis whereby each 
block has either a security bit or a security word associated 
therewith. Or, encrypted and clear software may be stored in 
different memory portions, or even in different memories, 
each one of which is identified either as secure or as clear. 
Also, the secure software may choose not to set the security 
indication for data that it creates, thereby allowing clear 
software to modify that data. 
Furthermore, if PDA 108 is ever lost by its user, server 
105 can reload the encrypted software into a replacement 
PDA purchased by the user, because server 105 has main 
tained a record of previous sales of encrypted software to 
this user (see step 215 of FIG. 2). Similarly, if the user of 
PDA 108 replaces PDA 108 with an upgraded unit, server 
105 can load the upgraded unit with new, upgraded versions 
of the encrypted software that the user had owned. In either 
case, however, the user loses the clear software, unless the 
user has made a backup copy thereof. Server 105 may 
optionally provide users with a backup service, whereby 
users periodically access server 105 and transfer their non 
secure files, as well as secure datafiles, to server 105, which 
then stores these files until such time as the users request 
server 105 to transfer them back to their PDAs. Such 
changes and modifications can be made without departing 
from the spirit and the scope of the invention and without 
diminishing its attendant advantages. It is therefore intended 
that such changes and modifications be covered by the 
following claims. 
I claim: 
1. A program-execution apparatus comprising: 
means for receiving both encrypted programs and unen 
crypted programs; 
means for storing the received programs; 
means for executing the stored programs; and 
means for selectively preventing the executing means 
from executing the stored programs that were received 
unencrypted, while allowing the executing means to 
execute the stored programs that were received 
encrypted. 
2. The apparatus of claim 1 wherein: 
the preventing and allowing means comprise 
a manually-actuatable actuator that, when actuated, pre 
vents the executing means from executing the stored 
programs that were received unencrypted. 
3. The apparatus of claim 1 having a unique apparatus 
identifier, wherein 
the executing means execute only unencrypted programs; 
and 
the apparatus further comprises 
means for decrypting into unencrypted programs only 
those of the received encrypted programs that are 
encrypted via an encryption arrangement that is based 
on said unique apparatus identifier. 
4. The apparatus of claim 1 wherein execution of a 
program may modify another program, further comprising: 
means for preventing the programs that were received 
unencrypted from modifying the programs that were 
received encrypted. 
5. The apparatus of claim 1 wherein execution of a 
program may modify either another program or data gener 
ated by the other program, wherein: 
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the storing means include 
means for storing data generated by execution of the 
stored programs by the executing means; 
means for identifying both those stored programs that 
were received encrypted and those stored data that were 
generated by execution of the programs that were 
received encrypted; and 
means for preventing the programs that were received 
unencrypted from modifying both the identified pro 
grams and the identified data. 
6. A program-execution apparatus having a unique appa 
ratus identifier and comprising: 
a receiver for receiving both encrypted programs and 
unencrypted programs; 
a decryption engine for decrypting, into unencrypted 
programs, only those of the encrypted programs that 
are encrypted via an encryption arrangement that is 
based on said unique apparatus identifier; 
a memory for storing both the received programs and data 
generated by execution of the received programs; 
a processor for executing only unencrypted said stored 
programs, wherein execution of an unencrypted stored 
program may modify either another stored program or 
data generated by the other stored program; 
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means for identifying both those stored programs that 
were received encrypted and those stored data that were 
generated by execution of the programs that were 
received encrypted; 
means for preventing the programs that were received 
unencrypted from modifying both the identified pro 
grams and the identified data; and 
means for selectively preventing the processor from 
executing the stored programs not identified by the 
identifying means while allowing the processor to 
execute the stored programs identified by the identify 
ing means. 
7. The apparatus of claim 6 wherein: 
the preventing and allowing means comprise 
a manually-activable actuator that, when actuated, pre 
vents the processor from executing the stored programs 
not identified by the identifying means. 
8. The apparatus of claim 6 wherein: 
the apparatus is portable, and 
the receiver is a wireless receiver. 
9. The apparatus of claim 8 wherein: 
the portable apparatus is a personal digital assistant, and 
the wireless receiver is an infrared receiver. 
a at it sk 
